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Abstract
Using a matching and a difference in differences approach we analyzed the im-
pact of a payroll costs reduction implemented through a tax reform in Colombia
on worked hours and hourly income. Existing studies have found mixed results,
while increases in wages are commonly found, the results for employment and
worked hours effects are a source of debate with no consensus on sight.
However, in line with earlier revisions of literature, we concluded that the effect
of payroll costs reductions is positive and significant on both, worked hours and
income. In this paper, using socioeconomic data from Colombia we found that
those individuals affected by a payroll cost reduction between 2012-2014 exhibited
significant increases in both hours and income compared to similar individuals
unaffected by this framework.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Governments will always face several challenges and harbor doubts concerning the effec-
tiveness of any tax reform and its possible effects on the whole economy. Does it seem
affected? What would be the aftermath for markets? Will income levels increase or
there will be any other unexpected outcomes? These issues must be considered deeply,
it is true that it is better to embark on these reforms required by the nation sooner
than later as it is also important to objectively analyze the way these reforms played
turn out against the goals initially considered when proposing them.
We will focus on the second chapter of Law 1607 of 2012, regarding and CREE tax.
This tax replaces payroll taxes that were paid by companies for employees earning less
than ten minimum wages. Previously, employers made payments on health insurance
(8.5%), ICBF - Colombian Institute of Family Welfare - (3%) and - SENA National
Education Service - (2%), now the CREE imposes a charge of 8% on companies’ in-
come. This paper develops an estimation model for working hours and wages taking
into account those decisions made by citizens when they are directly affected by a tax
reform, specifically a reduction in payroll costs, in terms of choosing to work more hours
or not making any changes.
This paper is divided as follows: section 2 describes the Colombian institutional fea-
tures of the payroll tax reform introduced in Law 1607, section 3 presents the review
if literature, section 4 describes data and methods; our results are provided in section
5; section 6 introduces a discussion of methodological considerations and robustness of
our estimates, and our conclusions are presented in section 7.
2 Background
During the last decades, Colombia has been one of the countries with more tax reforms
Larrea and Uribe (2012) with 19 reforms implemented between 1990-2009. The 2012
Law is different from its predecessors, while the main objectives of all the previous ones
were the reduction of the deficit, increase tax collection and stronger economic stability,
the three objectives of the last one were to reduce inequality though better distribution
of the income tax, reducing informality and improving job creation through a payroll
tax reduction and diminishing tax evasion through anti-avoidance regulations Ca´rdenas
(2012). This reduction amounts to 8% of total labor cost and 13.5% in payroll taxes
Farne´ and Rodr´ıguez (2013).
Congreso de la Repu´plica (2012) Law 1607 includes 10 chapters and 187 articles sup-
porting the creation of 3 new taxes, establishing changes in the value added tax and
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new repercussions for tax evaders are established. Income tax for enterprises lowed from
33% to 25%, nevertheless in the 20 article of the bill CREE, was conceived with a rate
of 9% for 2013, 2014 and 2015 from 2016 rate will be 8%. It substitutes payroll taxes
that were made by enterprises. Finally income tax for individuals was transformed in
IMAN and IMAS taxes. In Colombia payroll tax reductions have not been common.
Laws 50 of 1990 and 789 of 2002 included labor reforms, diminishing costs of hiring
paid staff, but shortly after its implementation these decreases were offset by increases
in social security contributionsFarne´ and Rodr´ıguez (2013).
Now, after the brief overview above we will move to a specific in-detail study case.
In 2012 the Colombian government carried out an ambitious tax reform which argued
that payroll taxes were a major obstacle for job creation. Hence, the 20th article of Law
1607 from December 2012 creates the CREE later implemented in January 2013 with
the purpose of redesigning income taxes turning them into a contribution by taxpayers
bringing benefits for employees, job creation and social investment. Through the CREE
law, the Colombian Congress approved a reduction in income taxes suppressing payroll
taxes, mainly social security, for employees making less than ten minimum wages in
businesses with two or more employees.
The reform pushed by the government is expected to reduce inequality by 1.9 points
in the GINI Index, increase formal employment by 11% and increase the relative size
of the formal sector between 10% and 15%. Ca´rdenas (2012). These tax relieves were
meant to make it easier and cheaper to hire workers, especially by the formal sector.
On the other hand, to guarantee the sustainability and independence of social security
agencies, the Colombian Congress approved the CREE tax, which represents a whole
change given the way is applied as it taxes revenues instead of payroll. This new ap-
proach would take a stake of tax burden away from economic sectors acknowledged
as employment creators, such as industry and agriculture, and put it on those sectors
which relies heavily on capital such as mining and financial sector Gaviria (2004).
3 Literature Review
In 1995, the unemployment rate in Colombia reached 9.0%, before the 90’s crisis, reach-
ing levels close to 20% between 1999 and 2001. By 2007 unemployment had been sub-
stantially reduced standing at 13.5%. The subsequent reduction of unemployment to
one digit matched the implementation of the tax reform analyzed in this paper.
Under a partial equilibrium model on the labor market Farne´ and Rodr´ıguez (2013)
show that the effects of a reduction in payroll taxes depend on five main factors: labor
cost demand elasticity, labor cost supply elasticity, employees’ valuation of taxes - which
determines the amount employees are willing to see their payment reduced for services
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covered by payroll taxes - , the existence of a minimum wage and the bargaining power
of workers. Under these factors it is not obvious that reducing payroll taxes drives a
higher employment level, for instance if supply were perfectly inelastic there would not
be any effect on employment but wages would be affected.
On the other hand, Pissarides (1998) simulates a decline in taxes on labor under differ-
ent labor market models such as a competitive market, a searching model, an efficiency
wages model and a model of wage bargaining between firms and unions. Results differ
among models. His conclusions point that if unemployment benefits are increased in
proportion to the wage rate when taxes are cut real wages are likely to absorb tax
changes but if unemployment benefits are not indexed to wages (and are held fixed in
real terms) the employment effects of the tax cut can be sizeable. The results found
under the assumptions of union wage bargaining and search models, point to another
issue which is as important in policy designing. Proportional and progressive taxes
under a monopoly have much less of an impact on employment than regressive taxes.
In countries where there is regressive taxation (which usually takes the form of a fixed
component in the tax levied on employers, or of a ceiling on social security contribu-
tions), a revenue-neutral reform of the tax system to a proportional or progressive tax
can have larger employment effects than an across-the-board reduction in the marginal
tax rate.
Bennmarker et al. (2009) carry out an impact evaluation using a difference-in-differences
approach, on a 10% payroll tax reduction introduced in 2002 for enterprises in Northern
Sweden. Effects on employment are not found, however, they recorded a positive impact
on the average wage per employee. While Betcherman and Page´s (2007) conducted a
series of empirical tests for determining the impact of a reform that reduced social in-
surance contributions in Turkey; results suggest a null effect on employment generation.
Econpubblica (2011) develops a research on the impact of a tax reform package in 31
European countries, the United States and Japan in 1990-2008. The analysis focuses
on payroll tax reduction reforms. Significant results on employment are not observed;
their policy recommendations suggest that tax policy plays a weaker role on the labor
market than wage bargaining arrangements, monetary and in-kind transfers, job place-
ment services, training programs, and support to geographical mobility. And in order
to have some impact on the labor market, tax policies should not be across-the-board
but targeted on particular groups of workers.
Gruber (1995) studied the effect of a 25% payroll tax reduction during 6 years in
Chile, years after the privatization of the social security system. He uses a panel data
from 1979 to 1986 for manufacturing firms. His results indicate an increase on wages
with no effects on employment.
Different papers have discussed this topic locally. Kugler and Kugler (2008) used a
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panel data from 1980 to 1990 for Colombian manufacturing industry, evaluating an
increase in payroll taxes; their results indicate that a 10% increase in these taxes de-
creased formal employment between 4% and 5% over the period of study. This suggests
that a reduction in social security taxes, in Latin America countries, would increase de-
mand for skilled workers as in these countries benefits linked to the minimum wage
are often not directly linked to contributions. Results could be asymmetric hence the
loss in employment because an increase in these contributions might be higher that the
employment gain from decreasing these taxes.
Meanwhile, Gaviria (2004) evaluated the labor reform of 2002, which diminished firing
costs and increased the ordinary labor journey, among other things. Through indirect
evidence of household surveys and direct evidence from a corporate survey using a
difference-in-differences approach, found that the reform had no significant effects on
employment generation or on formalizing it.
Botero (2012) through a computable general equilibrium model, evaluates the total
elimination of payroll taxes with and without compensation in other fiscal income rel-
ative to a baseline scenario. In the first scenario, 351,000 employments are created,
reducing unemployment rate by 0.6% with an increase of 3.5 points over GPD in public
deficit. Under a less adverse scenario for public finances, offsetting the reduction of
payroll taxes with an increase in indirect taxes, the outcome is modest: 173,000 em-
ployments are created.
The importance of this study relies on the evidence of the positive effects on the labor
market it provides. The results we found in our study should provide a useful guide for
more policies concerning tax reforms and be used as reference in further studies. This
study enriches former literature adding evidence of not only positive effects on hours
but also on hourly income.
4 Data and Methods
4.1 Data
We use demographic data from 2012 to 2014 from Great Integrated Household Survey
Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, GEIH), a nation-wide survey that allows to ana-
lyze results by rural and urban areas, regions and departments.
The 2012, 2013 and 2014 surveyed data were obtained from the National Statistics
Agency (Departamento de Administracio´n Nacional de Estad´ısticas, DANE), which al-
lows us to review socio-economic indicators at urban level, such as education, social
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security, employment, housing and informality.
4.1.1 Unit of analysis
The major entity studied in this work as unit of analysis are the individuals who belong
to one of the four following groups: The treated group, conformed by those directly
affected by the reform; a first control group, individuals whose salary is equal or higher
than ten minimum wages, and a second control group, workers labeled as informal fol-
lowing the DANE’s definition regarding the size of the company and their occupation,
and a fourth group of those employees that don’t pay for any kind of social security or
insurance.
All of the individuals analyzed reside in one of the 13 main cities used by the DANE
for labor market data gathering, defining main city as a continuous urban area legally
recognized by the Colombian state. The cities included in this study are large (Bo-
gota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla), mid-size (Bucaramanga, Cucuta, Cartagena
and Pereira) and small (Ibague, Manizales, Pasto, Villavicencio and Monteria).
4.1.2 Treatment assignment
In this study we will consider the implementation of the CREE as a treatment which
could have an impact on those individuals directly affected by the tax reform. This
method implies the definition of both a control group and a treated group.
Usually, a tax reform is planned to redesign a whole set of taxpayers making it difficult
to select a specific set of characteristics for a treatment group, however, the CREE Law
is specific enough in terms of observable variables which allows to develop a well-defined
treatment group.
In this way, our treatment group will be conformed by those individuals who have a
formal job and earn less than ten minimum wages, excluding those employees that work
in ONGs and non-national firms due to their different tax framework.
4.1.3 Covariates
In order to isolate the causal effect of the tax reform on worked hours and salary, we
compile a set of observable covariates that jointly affect the treatment assignment with
worked hours and salary outcomes (and assuming that all unobservable variables do
not exhibit influence). These covariates are used in our analysis to control for the ob-
servable differences between treated and untreated individuals in the observation units,
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Table 1: Summary statistics for outcome variables and covariates of interest in the
baseline period, December 2012
Variable Description Status Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Hours Total worked hours in a week Treated 50.624 12.781 2 48 126
Control 1 49.519 18.025 4 48 122
Control 2 47.214 21.961 1 48 130
Control 3 37.681 27.896 0 45 126
Income-H monetary hourly income per hour Treated 5114.056 4640.005 0 3472.222 104166.7
Control 1 13077.93 20670.21 0 5000 236842.1
Control 2 3921.968 6443.394 0 2580 120192.3
Control 3 3525.198 4401.383 0 2604.167 80882.35
Exper Potential experience Treated 16.835 11.939 0 14 71
= Age-Educa-6 Control 1 20.004 13.470 0 19 70
Control 2 27.206 15.775 0 27 74
Control 3 19.086 14.441 0 16.00 70.00
Educa years of education Treated 11.513 3.527 0 11 17
Control 1 12.072 4.125 0 13 17
Control 2 8.555 4.149 0 9 17
Control 3 9.525 3.835 0 11.00 17.00
Male =1 if Male Treated 0.562 0.496 0 1 1
0 Otherwise Control 1 0.548 0.497 0 1 1
Control 2 0.530 0.499 0 1 1
Control 3 0.612 0.487 0 1 1
Head =1 if Head of the house Treated 0.562 0.496 0 1 1
0 Otherwise Control 1 0.404 0.490 0 0 1
Control 2 0.482 0.499 0 0 1
Control 3 0.366 0.481 0 0 1
Age Age Treated 34.346 10.958 14.00 32.00 80.00
Control 1 38.129 12.874 12.000 37.000 78.000
Control 2 41.760 14.088 12.00 42.00 80.00
Control 3 34.602 12.920 12.00 32.00 79.00
Unem-house % of unemployed in the household Treated 0.044 0.115 0 0 0.75
Control 1 0.029 0.093 0 0 0.600
Control 2 0.041 0.110 0 0 0.750
Control 3 0.133 0.205 0 0 1.00
Nonlabincome Non labor income Treated 152148.7 384777.1 2000 74750 7500000
Control 1 668763.52 3338609 5833.333 100000 3.43e+07
Control 2 161641.5 358220.9 2083.333 61666.67 5000000
Control 3 220267.7 1083155 1666.667 70833.34 1.60e+07
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therefore, isolating the impact of the tax reform.
Potential Experience: Total experience is an unobservable variable in the survey,
we built potential experience as age minus years of education minus 6, which is sup-
posed to be the age of school entry, this covariate is a determinant of the wage.
Head of the household: in the Colombian Integrated Survey of Households: In-
dividuals self-select as head of household given their sociocultural believes, one may
expect that this type of people are the main workforce of the household and participate
more actively in the labor market.
% of unemployed in the household: We use these variable as a measure of pressure
for offering the workforce into the labor market. Calculated as the number of people
who reported being unemployed divided by the members of the household that are part
of the labor force.
Non labor income: We built this variable as the sum of rental income, government
subsidies, interest income and transfers of money from other households, among others.
This variable could measure an income effect on the individual labor supply and the
decision of choose more leisure.
4.2 Methods
To reduce the bias associated with our estimates of the effects on worked hours and
hourly wage after a tax reform, we use matching as a strategy to control for those
heterogeneities which could affect the treatment effect estimate. We use a model of
difference-in-differences with additional regressors and repetitive cross section as an an-
cillary strategy not only to check the robustness of our matching specification but also
to control pre-existent differences.
To measure the impact of the cut in payroll costs brought by the CREE Law on work-
ing hours and salary in the chosen cities we used difference-in-differences and matching
methodologies to estimate the average treatment on the treated (ATT). Estimation of
the ATT is implied in our research question: What would have the outcome in wage
and worked hours for employees benefitted by the reform been hadn’t they been covered
by the reform?
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τatt = E[Yi(1)|Di = 1]− E[Yi(0)|Di = 0]
ˆτatt = (Y¯ |D = 1)− (Y¯ |D = 0)
4.2.1 Differences in differences
The first issue to consider before the estimation is the fact that we are not dealing
with a randomized assignment to treatment, instead it is determined by a set of char-
acteristics defined by the tax reform making an individual a treated or an untreated
observation in the model, making of this assignment a quasi-experiment Salzberg (1999).
Using the previous assignment, it is now necessary to define the characteristics in-
side the control group, however, those individuals outside the reform present several
heterogeneities among them making it necessary to define not just one control group
but three.
Following this statement, our first control group (D1) will be those individuals whose
salary is equal to or higher than ten minimum wages. The second group (D2) includes
those workers labeled as informal following the DANE’s definition regarding the size
of the company and their occupation, and finally, the third group (D3) gathers those
employees that don’t pay for any kind of social security or insurance.
The basic model is a difference-in-differences estimator with additional regressors and
repetitive cross section. The inclusion of an auxiliary set of variables responds to the
fact that the tax reform implementation acts as a natural experiment and not a con-
trolled one, it is important to highlight that this study faces a context where there is not
a perfect randomness or even any of it facing the possibility of systematic differences
between the treated and the untreated Bertrand et al. (2002).
Yi = β0 + β1Di + β2I[t = 2] + β3(Di ∗ I[t = 2]) + β4X1i + ...+ βk+3Xki + uit
here Di equals 1 if the observation belongs to treatment and 0 if not, I[t = 2] is an
indicator equals to 1 if t = 2 (A time of period after tax reform implementation) and 0
otherwise.
Hence, the basic model includes a sort of variables which measures individual char-
acteristics non directly affected by the treatment. Another bunch of advantages in
words of Bernal and Pen˜a (2011) for this specification is not only the chance to control
pre-existent differences but also improve the estimator’s efficiency, analyze the alleged
parallel tendencies and an adjusted estimator when the assignment was carried out con-
ditionally to some observable characteristics of the participant individuals Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983).
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This last advantage is very relevant in our study because the design of our analysis
group followed a a conditional assignment based on the reform’s framework Bernal and
Pen˜a (2011).
Using a repetitive cross-section methodology proves itself the fittest one due to the
implicit nature of the GEIH survey, because in its development does not include any
kind of follow-up for the observations over time. This implies that between months the
homes surveyed vary, so in order to develop the estimation its necessary for the data
to be randomly collected inside the same population using observations from the first
cut as substitutes for the controls and treated of the later cut Stock and Watson (2012).
4.2.2 Matching
The second methodology used is matching as a strategy to estimate ATT by accounting
for the covariates that predict receiving the treatment. Here every observation receives
a propensity score understood as the probability of being assigned to treatment given
a set of covariates Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
P (X) = P (D = 1|X)
If we wanted to estimate the impact of a treatment comparing potential outcomes
Y (0)and Y (1) of both groups we would have.
E(Yi(1)|Di = 1)− E(Yi(0)|Di = 0)
Then including the contrafactual term, E(Yi(0)|D = 0), we have
= E(Yi(1)|Di = 1)− E(Yi(0)|Di = 1) + E(Yi(0)|Di = 1)− E(Yi(0)|Di = 0)
That way treatment is assigned independent of potential outcomes Y (1) and Y (0) under
treatment (Di = 1) and control (Di = 0). In the absence of the treatment, one would
expect similar average outcomes from both groups. By the other hand, if both groups
were to receive treatment, one would expect similar average outcomes from both groups.
Formally, if the program assignment is completely based in observable features, we could
say that
Y (0), Y (1) ⊥ D|X, ∀X
Known as the conditional independence condition, allowing us to assure that E(Y (0)|D =
1, X) = E(Y (0)|D = 0, X) making equal to zero the selection bias. Assuming that these
conditions are accomplished , the ATT using matching could be expressed as
τattpsm = EP (X)|D=1 {E[Y (1)|D = 1, P (X)]− E[Y (0)|D = 0, P (X)]}
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5 Results
Table 2 and Table 3 present the results from our primary analyses (table 2 provides
results from for our primary specifications in 2013 and Table 3 does it for 2014). In
this subsection we focus on the table 2 and table 3, which present the ATT estimates
by each of the methodologies.
Table 2 shows that the results for the analysis in 2013 are relatively robust to the
introduction of calipers, there is not a significant change in the point estimate of ATT.
No observation was dropped from the analysis. The results show an increase in hourly
wage and worked hours outcomes across matched treated and untreated individuals
(0.253 and 4.69, respectively), and the point estimate is significant at 5% for the hourly
wage and at any conventional level for the worked hours. Results for Diff-in-Diff speci-
fication showed that the resulting ATT estimate is 0.018 for the hourly wage and 313
for the worked hours, however, these are insignificant at conventional levels and only
significant by 5%, respectively.
Table 3 shows that the results for the analysis in 2014 are relatively robust to the
introduction of calipers, there is not a significant change in the point estimate of ATT.
No observation was dropped from the analysis. The results show an increase in hourly
wage and worked hours outcomes across matched treated and untreated individuals
(0.313 and 5.26 respectively), and the point estimate is significant at 5% for the hourly
wage and at any conventional level for the worked hours. Results for Diff-in-Diff speci-
fication showed that the resulting ATT estimate is 0.079 for the hourly wage and 2.81
for the worked hours, however, these are significant at conventional levels and only
significant by 10%, respectively.
For both our Matching and Diff in Diff approaches we find evidence to suggest that
the implementation of a tax reform over payroll costs reduction had positive effects over
hourly incomes and worked hours for those which are covered by the reform.
In other words, after controlling for covariates that jointly influence the participation
of individuals inside the reforms, we find that there was differentially greater increases
in worked hours and hourly income between 2012 and 2014 for those individuals which
were covered by the payroll costs reduction implemented by the government. The point
estimates from the primary specification are statistically significant (at 10% significance
level) for 2014 when worked hours hours and hourly incomes are used as the outcome
of interest for the second control group, but is insignificant when the remaining control
groups are used for estimating the outcomes of interest.
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Table 2: Results from Primary Analyzes, 2013
Ln(gross hourly wage) Worked Hours
Treated Control ATT Treated Control ATT
Y(1) Y(0) Y(1) Y(0)
Naive Difference 8.324 7.807 0.516*** 50.900 48.002 2.898∗∗∗
in Means [9551] [13443] {0.00} [9569] [14974] {0.000}
Diff-in-Diff N.A. N.A. 0.018 N.A. N.A. 3.135∗∗
[9551] [11946] {0.500} [9569] [13357] {0.045}
Matching 8.400 8.147 0.253∗∗ 49.471 44.773 4.698∗∗∗
[1698] [2684] (0.044) [1702] [2865] (0.98)
Matching with 8.400 8.147 0.253∗∗ 49.471 44.773 4.698∗∗∗
Calipersa [1698] [2684] (0,044) [1702] [2865] (0,98)
a Caliper = 0.5 standard deviations.
[Number of observations].
(Standard Error).
{P-value}.
∗∗∗,∗∗ represent significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Table 3: Results from Primary Analyzes, 2014
Ln(gross hourly wage) Worked Hours
Treated Control ATT Treated Control ATT
Y(1) Y(0) Y(1) Y(0)
Naive Difference 8.327 7.823 0.504∗∗∗ 50.720 47.847 2.873∗∗∗
in Means [9941] [13220] {0.00} [9962] [14874] {0.00}
Diff-in-Diff N.A. N.A. 0.079∗∗∗ N.A. N.A. 2.813∗
[9941] [11814] {0.005} [9962] [14874] {0.073}
Matching 8,379 8.066 0.313∗∗∗ 49.532 44.271 5.261∗∗∗
[1653] [2638] (0.047) [1659] [2841] (0.99)
Matching with 8.379 8.066 0.313∗∗∗ 49.532 44.271 5.261∗∗∗
Calipersa [1653] [2638] (0.047) [1659] [2841] (0.99)
a Caliper = 0.5 standard deviations.
[Number of observations].
(Standard Error).
{P-value}.
∗∗∗,∗∗ represent significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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6 Robustness
We test the robustness of our primary estimates in several ways. First, we test the
sensitivity of our matching estimator to unobserved heterogeneity between treated and
untreated individuals. The objective is to identify by how much the groups would have
to differ in order to nullify the results of statistically significant worked hours and hourly
income increases.
Second, we test the robustness of our diff-in-diff and matching specifications by compar-
ing our main specification to a number of matching- and regression-based econometric
specifications.
Matching specifications inside every observational study must take into account
the fact that the elimination of any bias associated with non-randomized selection is
settled by the understanding of the selection process ?, hence, by an array of pertinent
features actually observable and available for the researcher. If the selection process
and outcomes were determined only by observable features then a treatment effect es-
timate resulting from a matching procedure properly balanced should be unbiased and
consistent Rosenbaum et al. (2002).
However, in case there are unobservable characteristics uncorrelated with the observ-
able characteristics for which we control but also contribute to determining selection
and outcomes, then a hidden bias might arise to which matching estimators are not
robust. We believe the tax reform´s framework provides not only sufficient and clearly
observable covariates with which to control, therefore mitigating unobserved hetero-
geneity.
Nevertheless, we tested the sensitivity of the ATT estimates for worked hours to unob-
served heterogeneity and bias using the Rosenbaum bounds Rosenbaum et al. (2002)
The Rosenbaum bounds methodology resolves if the unobserved factors can alter in-
ferences about treatment effects, so it helps to determine how strongly an unmeasured
variable must influence the selection process to undermine the implications of the anal-
ysis.
If only a little amount of unobserved heterogeneity is necessary to weaken the sig-
nificance of the results then these are sensitive, by the other hand, if a great amount is
required we are obtaining relatively robust results. Table reftable4 indicates the level
of unobserved heterogeneity (unaccounted in our matching process for worked hours)
that would be required to nullify our results of statistically significant worked hours.
Our results are robust (at the 10% level) to unobserved heterogeneity that affects the
odds of selection into treatment (tax reform payroll costs reduction) by a factor of 2.0.
Additionally we carry on some checks on covariate balance in the matching estimates
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Table 4: Rosenbaum Upper Bound on P-Value at Given Levels of Γ for Matching
Analysis
Upper Bound
Γ P-value
1 0.144
1.1 0.126
1.2 0.110
1.3 0.097
1.4 0.085
1.5 0.075
1.6 0.067
1.7 0.059
1.8 0.052
1.9 0.046
2 0.041
as some kind of informal diagnostics, not unlike residuals in a regression, ?, as a help-
ing tool to think about whether our treated and control groups overlap sufficiently to
be matched in first place, and whether the match currently under consideration has
achieved reasonable balance.
The previous tables showed a slightly imbalance once the primary matching analysis
Figure 1: Balance checks for 21 covariates in the study of tax reform effects over labor
supply. The box-plots show that the imbalances in covariates were slightly increased
by the matching process, in both worked ours and hourly income. Balance on observed
covariates does not imply balance on covariates that were not observed.
was solved, this may indicate the necessary inclusion of some penalties in the weight
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matrix.
6.1 Robustness of matching specification to alternative econo-
metric specifications
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of econometric specification,
we conduct a series of ancillary matching- and regression-based analyzes. The results
of these analyzes can be found in Tables 3 and 4.
Matching with calipers as penalties In our primary econometric specification we
use one-to one nearest neighbor matching. Although there is an acceptable level of
balance, there could be a number of treated observations that do not obtain a well-
matched control.
To ensure that a set of poorly matched observations are not biasing the results, we im-
pose calipers, equal to 0.5 standard deviations, on our primary matching specification.
In other words, we intend to remove from the sample any matched pair that differ by
more than half standard deviation across covariates values.
Tables 3 and 4 show that the results for the worked hours and hourly income are
robust to the introduction of calipers, i.e., there is not any kind of absolute increase or
decrease in the point estimates of ATT. On the other hand, the variance of the resulting
ATT changes little and the estimates are significant at 10% level for 2014.
6.1.1 Regression-based specifications
We run several matching specifications to ensure that our results are not driven by the
choice of an econometric specification. The results of these specifications are found in
appendix for full regression results.
Although there is some heterogeneity in the specifications for which worked hours or
hourly income are the outcomes, the main results from these specifications are: (1)
Treated individuals are associated with significant increases in both worked hours and
hourly income and; (2) the results do not differ significantly from the primary matching-
based estimates.
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6.2 Robustness of matching specification to alternative econo-
metric specifications and control groups design
As in the former section, we also run several Diff-in Diff specifications which differ in the
design of those control groups used to estimate the treatment effects over the outputs
of interest to ensure that our results are not driven by the choice of an econometric
specification or a control group. The results of these specifications are found in tables
5 and 6 for 2013 and tables 7 and 8 for 2014 for full regression results.
7 Conclusions
The central finding in our results is that the tax reform carried out by the Colombian
government generated an increase in worked hours and hourly income for those covered
by the change in the payroll costs framework. We used two separate methodologies
in our analysis and found that the point estimates of worked hours and hourly wage
increases are robust across our econometric specifications. The implications of our
results are many. First, our results add to a body of literature on the impacts of tax
reforms over labor markets. Besides, our findings also support findings in literature that
payroll costs reduction brings a positive effect on wages and worked hours. Second, we
found several differences from previous studies which indicate that evidence from a
single country is likely not generalizable across countries. Further studies in Colombia
and elsewhere should strive to identify and quantify the mechanisms through which
a payroll costs reduction affect the unemployment and informality levels. Although
studies such as ours are important for building a first understanding of the general
impacts on worked hours and wages inside the labor markets, only by understanding how
a reduction in payroll costs affects the labor market (especially in terms of informality
and jobs creation) can policies be designed to enhance the positive impacts of this tax
reform.
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8 Appendix
Table 5: Balance Results for nearest neighbor Specification Wage
Covariate Status Mean Treated Mean Non-Treated Diff. In Means Nom. Diff
Head of household Unmatched 0.3913 0.623 -0.231 -0.233
Matched 0.526 0.623 -0.096 -0.097
Age Unmatched 30.080 45.27 -15.190 -3.463
Matched 36.420 45.270 -8.85 -1.689
Stake of unemployed in household Unmatched 0.079 0.046 0.033 0.064
Matched 0.043 0.046 -0.003 -0.006
Non-Labour Income Unmatched 194634.1 164789.6 29844.5 40.251
Matched 165881.8 164789.6 1092.199 1.343
Years of education Unmatched 16.47 8.45 8.02 3.517
Matched 11.77 8.45 3.32 1.162
Potential experience Unmatched 7.65 30.81 -23.16 -5.059
Matched 18.66 30.81 -12.15 -2.204
Male Unmatched 0.95 0.357 0.593 0.720
Matched 0.464 0.357 0.107 0.108
Table 6: Balance Results for nearest neighbor Specification Hours
Covariate Status Mean Treated Mean Non-Treated Diff. In Means Nom. Diff
Head of household Unmatched 0.416 0.624 -0.208 -0.210
Matched 0.526 0.624 -0.097 -0.098
Age Unmatched 30 45.49 -15.49 -3.532
Matched 36.490 45.49 -9.0 -1.718
Stake of unemployed in household Unmatched 0.076 0.043 0.033 0.064
Matched 0.043 0.043 0.0 0.0
Non-Labour Income Unmatched 170031 168298.1 1732.899 2.337
Matched 165494.3 168298.1 -2803.8 -3.448
Years of education Unmatched 16.45 8.47 7.98 3.499
Matched 11.709 8.47 3.239 1.134
Potential experience Unmatched 7.56 31.01 -23.45 -5.123
Matched 18.79 31.01 -12.22 -2.217
Male Unmatched 0.916 0.35 0.566 0.687
Matched 0.458 0.35 0.108 0.109
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Table 7: Diff-in-Diff regression specifications for Hourly Income 2013
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(gross hourly wage) Ln(gross hourly wage) Ln(gross hourly wage)
I 0.113 0.0639∗∗ 0.00614
(0.0874) (0.0226) (0.0475)
DxI -0.0407 0.0186 0.0674
(0.0889) (0.0277) (0.0501)
D -0.247∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.0665) (0.0209) (0.0366)
Exper 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗
(0.00273) (0.00159) (0.00201)
Exper2 -0.000296∗∗∗ -0.000335∗∗∗ -0.000265∗∗∗
(0.0000704) (0.0000291) (0.0000448)
Educa 0.132∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.00334) (0.00251) (0.00294)
Male 0.174∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0142) (0.0163)
Cons 6.565∗∗∗ 6.468∗∗∗ 6.351∗∗∗
(0.0839) (0.0402) (0.0523)
N 10703 21493 11416
Cities′sDummies Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Diff-in-Diff regression specifications for Worked Hours 2013
(1) (2) (3)
Hours Hours Hours
I 4.126 -2.202 -1.465
(3.604) (1.367) (3.732)
DxI -3.566 2.799 1.953
(3.662) (1.569) (3.792)
D -0.0813 7.168∗∗∗ 4.312
(2.064) (1.176) (2.244)
Ln(Income-H) -6.397∗∗∗ -5.042∗∗∗ -6.866∗∗∗
(1.215) (0.737) (1.168)
Head 1.999∗ 3.680∗∗∗ 2.747∗∗
(0.849) (0.875) (0.893)
Age 0.636∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗
(0.231) (0.179) (0.260)
Age2 -0.00760∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗ -0.00901∗∗
(0.00286) (0.00206) (0.00328)
Unem-house -0.320 0.908 0.582
(3.816) (3.442) (4.119)
Ln(Nonlabincome) 0.618 -0.289 0.0317
(0.404) (0.380) (0.411)
Educa 0.268 0.137 0.358∗
(0.168) (0.126) (0.172)
Cons 80.91∗∗∗ 68.17∗∗∗ 86.19∗∗∗
(9.126) (7.122) (9.684)
N 1907 4073 1952
Cities′sDummies Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: Diff-in-Diff regression specifications for Hourly Income 2014
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(gross hourly wage) Ln(gross hourly wage) Ln(gross hourly wage)
I 0.221∗ 0.0281 0.0308
(0.0957) (0.0241) (0.0642)
DxI -0.123 0.0791∗∗ 0.0659
(0.0968) (0.0283) (0.0657)
D -0.246∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.0668) (0.0209) (0.0365)
Exper 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0267∗∗∗
(0.00220) (0.00158) (0.00193)
Exper2 -0.000168∗∗ -0.000291∗∗∗ -0.000254∗∗∗
(0.0000513) (0.0000305) (0.0000433)
Educa 0.129∗∗∗ 0.0992∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.00306) (0.00240) (0.00285)
Male 0.147∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0143) (0.0161)
Cons 6.653∗∗∗ 6.491∗∗∗ 6.421∗∗∗
(0.0829) (0.0383) (0.0509)
N 11022 21748 11704
Cities′sDummies Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Diff-in-Diff regression specifications for Worked Hours 2014
(1) (2) (3)
hstrt hstrt hstrt
I 4.126 -2.202 -1.465
(3.604) (1.367) (3.732)
DxI -3.566 2.799 1.953
(3.662) (1.569) (3.792)
D -0.0813 7.168∗∗∗ 4.312
(2.064) (1.176) (2.244)
Ln(Income-H) -6.397∗∗∗ -5.042∗∗∗ -6.866∗∗∗
(1.215) (0.737) (1.168)
Head 1.999∗ 3.680∗∗∗ 2.747∗∗
(0.849) (0.875) (0.893)
Age 0.636∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗
(0.231) (0.179) (0.260)
Age2 -0.00760∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗ -0.00901∗∗
(0.00286) (0.00206) (0.00328)
Unem-house -0.320 0.908 0.582
(3.816) (3.442) (4.119)
Ln(Nonlabincome) 0.618 -0.289 0.0317
(0.404) (0.380) (0.411)
Educa 0.268 0.137 0.358∗
(0.168) (0.126) (0.172)
Cons 80.91∗∗∗ 68.17∗∗∗ 86.19∗∗∗
(9.126) (7.122) (9.684)
N 1907 4073 1952
Cities′sDummies Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: Matching specifications 2013
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Head 0.0146 0.248∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0211) (0.0825)
Age 0.0891 0.199∗ 1.089
(0.279) (0.0986) (0.725)
Age2 -0.00109∗∗∗ -0.00144∗∗∗ -0.00182∗∗∗
(0.000235) (0.000113) (0.000423)
Unem-house 0.263 0.481∗∗∗ 0.372
(0.186) (0.0817) (0.266)
Ln(Nonlabincome) -0.0429∗
(0.0181)
Educa 0.0851 -0.00601 -0.902
(0.278) (0.0985) (0.724)
Exper -0.0440 -0.145 -1.014
(0.279) (0.0988) (0.725)
Exper2 0.000505∗∗ 0.000829∗∗∗ 0.000973∗∗
(0.000188) (0.0000914) (0.000308)
Male 0.307∗∗∗ 0.0889∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.0443) (0.0192) (0.0708)
lnitf m 0.289∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0511)
lnitran m -0.0864∗∗
(0.0302)
# of Children -0.0224
(0.0322)
Cons -1.591 -6.998∗∗∗ -12.89∗∗
(1.698) (0.624) (4.420)
N 4571 23399 2278
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: Matching specifications 2014
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Treatment Treatment
Head -0.00976 0.240∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0209) (0.0860)
Age 0.119 0.180∗ 0.436
(0.258) (0.0889) (0.366)
Age2 -0.00133∗∗∗ -0.00153∗∗∗ -0.00218∗∗∗
(0.000239) (0.000113) (0.000471)
Unem-house 0.440∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.538∗
(0.185) (0.0816) (0.267)
Ln(Nonlabincome) -0.0495∗∗
(0.0189)
Educa 0.0733 0.0179 -0.218
(0.258) (0.0887) (0.364)
Exper -0.0615 -0.120 -0.345
(0.258) (0.0891) (0.365)
Exper2 0.000643∗∗∗ 0.000852∗∗∗ 0.00117∗∗∗
(0.000190) (0.0000918) (0.000335)
Male 0.277∗∗∗ 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗
(0.0446) (0.0190) (0.0735)
lnitf m 0.314∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0533)
lnitran m -0.124∗∗∗
(0.0315)
# of Children -0.0312
(0.0336)
Cons -1.819 -7.230∗∗∗ -8.852∗∗∗
(1.569) (0.571) (2.335)
N 4524 23578 2188
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
